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Abstract
Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical diﬀerentiation, we show that
there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant
supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant.
We also prove that this entry sequence is also socially eﬃcient.
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1 Introduction
According to the established wisdom concerning vertically diﬀerentiated mar-
kets, earlier entrants appropriate the high-quality niches, while later entrants
fill the remaining lower part of the quality spectrum (Gabszewicz and Thisse,
1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Donnenfeld and Weber, 1992;
Lehmann, 1997). This is due to two basic assumptions according to which
the distribution of cumsumers’ willingness to pay is uniform and the game
unravels in a single period.
Here, we want to relax the second assumption, by adopting a simple
two-period setup, with sequential entry.1 Using a model whose original for-
mulation is in Cremer and Thisse (1991), we show that profit incentives drive
firms toward a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant
supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits as compared to the second
entrant. Moreover, we also prove that this entry sequence is also socially
eﬃcient, in that it entails a higher average quality level than the alternative
one. The remainder of the note is structured as follows. The setup is laid out
in section 2. The entry process and the welfare performance are investigated
in section 3.
1.1 The model
The market exists over two periods, t ∈ {0, 1}. In each period, a population
of consumer of unit size is uniformly distributed over the interval
£
θ, θ
¤
, with
θ = θ − 1. Parameter θ ∈
£
θ, θ
¤
measures a consumer’s marginal willingness
1In the above mentioned literature, entry is euristically considered in one-shot games,
without allowing any explicit role for calendar time. One exception is Dutta et al. (1995)
where, however, a high-quality advantage obtains.
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to pay for quality, and the net surplus from consumption is:
U = θqi − pi ≥ 0 (1)
where pi and qi are the price and quality of the product supplied by firm
i. We assume that (1) holds for all consumers in both periods, so that the
market is always fully covered.
On the supply side, any firm i must bear total cost Ci = cq
2
i xi per period,
where xi is the market demand for her product and c is a positive parameter.
Accordingly, firm i’s profit function is πi = (pi − cq2i )xi in each period.
In the remainder, we will consider the following game. Each firm irre-
versibly sets quality at the time of entry. At t = 0, the firm 1 enters and
remains a monopolist in that period. At t = 1, firm 2 enters and the mar-
ket becomes a duopoly. Hence, the problem of the first entrant (the leader)
consists in choosing whether to oﬀer a low- or high-quality good, correctly
anticipating the optimal behaviour of the second entrant (the follower). That
is, the stage describing quality choices is going to be solved a` la Stackelberg.
Once both qualities are set, Bertrand-Nash competition takes place.
The objective of the leader (firm 1) is:
max
pM ,p1,q1
Π1 ≡ πM1 + δπD1 = pM − cq21 + δ
¡
p1 − cq21
¢
x1 (2)
where πM1 = pM − cq21 are monopoly profits at t = 0, πD1 = (p1 − cq21) x1
are duopoly profits at t = 1, the latter being discounted by the factor δ ≡
1/ (1 + ρ) , with δ ∈ [0, 1] for all ρ ∈ [0,∞) . The objective of the follower
(firm 2) consists in maximising duopoly profits πD2 = (p2 − cq22)x2 w.r.t. p2
and q2.
The two firms will supply qualities qH ≥ qL > 0 at duopoly prices pH ≥
pL, and either q1 = qL; q2 = qH or the opposite. In either case, at t = 1, the
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consumer indexed by bθ = (pH − pL) / (qH − qL) will be indiﬀerent between
the two goods, so that we may define duopoly demands as follows:
xH = θ −
pH − pL
qH − qL
; xL =
pH − pL
qH − qL
−
¡
θ − 1
¢
. (3)
1.2 Optimal pricing behaviour
The optimal monopoly pricing at t = 0 can be quickly characterised, for any
given q1. Under full coverage, firm 1 sets the price driving to zero the net
surplus of the poorest consumer located at θ = θ − 1, i.e., pM =
¡
θ − 1
¢
q1.
Hence, monopoly profits are πM1 =
¡
θ − 1
¢
q1 − cq21.
The Nash game in prices is well known; therefore we omit a detailed
exposition (see Cremer and Thisse, 1991, and Lambertini, 1996, inter alia).
Equilibrium prices are:
pH =
(qH − qL)(θ + 1) + 2cq2H + cq2L
3
; pL =
(qH − qL)(2− θ) + 2cq2L + cq2H
3
(4)
so that profit functions simplify as follows:
πH =
(qH − qL)
£
θ + 1− c (qH + qL)
¤2
9
; πL =
(qH − qL)
£
2− θ + c (qH + qL)
¤2
9
.
(5)
Hence, we have two alternative scenarios. The first, where q1 = qL and
q2 = qH , is labelled as low-quality leadership; the second, where q1 = qH and
q2 = qL, is labelled as high-quality leadership.
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2 Entry
2.1 Low-quality leadership
In this case, πD1 = πL and π
D
2 = πH . The leader’s problem consists in:
2
max
qL
Π1L =
¡
θ − 1
¢
qL − cq2L +
(qH − qL)
£
2− θ + c (qH + qL)
¤2
9 (1 + ρ)
s.t. :
∂πH
∂qH
= 0⇔ q∗H =
θ + 1 + cqL
3c
(6)
Plugging q∗H intoΠ1L and solving the first order condition (FOC) ∂Π1L/∂qL =
0 w.r.t. qL, we obtain:
qL =
16θ − 81ρ− 113± 3p9ρ (81ρ+ 194) + 1081
32c
(7)
with
lim
ρ→∞
q−L = −∞ ; limρ→∞ q
+
L =
θ − 1
2c
the latter being the single-period optimal monopoly quality (see Lambertini,
1997). Therefore, Stackelberg equilibrium qualities are:
qlL =
16θ − 81ρ− 113± 3p9ρ (81ρ+ 194) + 1081
32c
q
f
H =
16θ − 27 (1 + ρ) +
p
9ρ (81ρ+ 194) + 1081
32c
(8)
where superscripts l and f stand for leader and follower, respectively. The
associated equilibrium profits are:
Π1L =
©
1152θ
¡
θ − 2
¢
(1 + ρ)− ρ
¡
19683ρ2 + 70713ρ+ 84969
¢
+
−33427 +Ψ3
ª
/ [4608c (1 + ρ)]
2There exists another solution to ∂πH/∂qH = 0, i.e., qH =
¡
θ + 1− cqL
¢
/c. However,
this can be excluded on the basis of concavity conditions.
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πH =
ρ (19683ρ2 + 82377ρ+ 115641) + 54739− [1657 + 9ρ (81ρ+ 242)]Ψ
2304c
(9)
where Ψ ≡
p
9ρ (81ρ+ 194) + 1081. Resorting to numerical simulations, it
can be ascertained that Π1L > πH in the admissible range of parameters.3
Equilibrium market shares in the duopoly phase are:
xlL =
Ψ− 27ρ− 19
24
; xfH =
27ρ+ 43−Ψ
24
; xlL > x
f
H always. (10)
Finally, bθ ∈ ¡θ, θ¢ always.
2.2 High-quality leadership
Now πD1 = πH and π
D
2 = πL. The leader’s problem consists in:
4
max
qH
Π1H =
¡
θ − 1
¢
qH − cq2H +
(qH − qL)
£
θ + 1− c (qH + qL)
¤2
9 (1 + ρ)
s.t. :
∂πL
∂qL
= 0⇔ q∗L =
θ − 2 + cqH
3c
(11)
Adopting the same procedure as in the previous case, we can find the optimal
qualities:
q
f
L =
16θ + 27ρ+ 11−
p
9ρ (81ρ+ 226) + 1369
32c
qlH =
16θ + 81ρ+ 97− 3
p
9ρ (81ρ+ 226) + 1369
32c
(12)
with limρ→∞ qH =
¡
θ − 1
¢
/ (2c) . Equilibrium profits are:
Π1H =
©
1152θ
¡
θ − 2
¢
(1 + ρ)− ρ
¡
19683ρ2 + 82377ρ+ 111753
¢
+
−48547 +Ψ3
ª
/ [4608c (1 + ρ)]
3The ranges are ρ ∈ [0,∞) , i.e., δ ∈ [0, 1] , and θ ≥ 7/2. The latter condition ensures
that full coverage obtains in duopoly. If so, then it also holds under monopoly, where
θ ≥ 3 would suﬃce (see Lambertini, 1996, 1997).
4There exists another solution to ∂πL/∂qL = 0, i.e., qL =
¡
θ − 2− cqH
¢
/c. Again, this
can be excluded on the basis of second order conditions.
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πL =
ρ (19683ρ2 + 88209ρ+ 130761) + 64027− (9ρ+ 13) (81ρ+ 133)Φ
2304c
(13)
where Φ ≡
p
9ρ (81ρ+ 226) + 1369. Again, numerical simulations show that
Π1H > πL in the admissible range of parameters.5 Equilibrium market shares
at t = 1 are:
xlL =
27ρ+ 43− Φ
24
; xfH =
Ψ− 27ρ− 19
24
; xlL < x
f
H always. (14)
Again, bθ ∈ ¡θ, θ¢ always.
2.3 The subgame perfect equilibrium and welfare as-
sessment
In order to complete the characterisation of the subgame perfect equilibrium,
consider the following inequalities:
Π1L > Π1H and πH > πL for all ρ ∈ [0,∞) . (15)
This holds for any admissible value of θ. Accordingly, we may state:
Proposition 1 The first entrant prefers to supply a low-quality good, while
the second entrant prefers to supply a high-quality good. Therefore, the sub-
game perfect equilibrium is unique and involves q1 = q
l
L; q2 = q
f
H .
Now we pass on to examine the welfare performance of the market in the
two cases. In general, the definition of the discounted social welfare over the
two periods is:
SW ≡ πM1 +
πD1 + π
D
2
1 + ρ
+ CS (16)
5In this case, the result is intuitive, in that high-quality supply combines with a period
of monopoly power, hence the first entrant’s profits are necessarily higher than the second
entrant’s.
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where discounted consumer surplus is:
CS ≡
Z θ
θ−1
(sq1 − pM) ds+
1
1 + ρ
ÃZ bθ
θ−1
(sqL − pL) ds+
Z θ
bθ (sqH − pH) ds
!
.
(17)
The relevant equilibrium expressions can be calculated using equilibrium
prices and qualities in the two settings, to obtain:
Proposition 2 Discounted social welfare is higher when the leader chooses
to oﬀer the low-quality good than the high-quality one, for all admissible
values of ρ and θ.
Therefore, there is no conflict between private and social incentives as
to the sequence of entry. The reason is that average quality is higher when
the leader enters with a low quality, as it can be ascertained from the diﬀer-
ence
³
qlL + q
f
H
´
/2−
³
q
f
L + q
l
H
´
/2, which is always positive in the admissible
parameter range.
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